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into photovoltaic power generation is 
an intriguing example of how 21st-
century globalization works. A solution 
to some of its own domestic energy 
needs, PV production has thrust China 
unavoidably into international markets 
and the entangled politics of supply. 
PV: International Markets 
and Trade Wars
The emergence of China’s PV industry 
has relied principally on the inter-
national market. In 2004, high-level 
feed-in tariffs and other PV subsidy 
policies initiated by several countries, 
including Germany, stimulated private 
investment in PV production all over 
the world. According to data from 
International Energy Agency (IEA), 
the Chinese domestic market for solar 
PV installation was less than 1 GW in 
2010, and 95% of PV modules produced 
there were exported to countries other 
than the U.S. (B. Lombardozzi, “True 
Cost of Chinese Solar Panels,” www.
americanmanufacturing.org [2014]). In 
2012, China exported large amounts 
of solar cells and modules worth $2.8 
billion, and accounted for 56% of all 
PV-related imports in the U.S. China’s 
large exports in this field are a result of 
the country’s low cost of production, 
which is itself a result of the low labor 
costs and government subsidies. 
The swift rise of PV exports from 
China has caused concerns about 
dumping in the importing countries. 
Dumping is when a company exports 
a product at a price lower than the 
normal price it usually sells for on the 
market in its own country. In 2011, 
the Coalition for American Solar 
Manufacturing (CASM), a coalition of 
250 U.S. companies involved in solar 
manufacturing and installation and led 
by U.S. Solar World, filed anti-dump-
ing and anti-subsidy duty petitions with 
the U.S. Department of Commerce 
(DOC) and the International Trade 
Commission (ITC) in order to prompt 
investigations into this misconduct. 
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Since 2008, China has seized the solar-power generation opportunity and leapfrogged into the largest producer and user of Photovoltaic 
(PV) systems in the world. In this time, its rate of PV 
capacity growth has been truly astounding. According 
to a China Photovoltaic Industry Alliance (CPIA) 
report released in January 2016, China reached 43 
Giga-Watts (GW) in cumulative installed capacity 
by the end of 2015 (see Figure 1) and has more than 
20% of the world’s cumulative installed capacity. 
Even more remarkable is that more than one third 
of this total (about 15GW) was installed within the 
year 2015 alone. The emerging solar PV industry 
in China is due to the three reasons: first, a rapidly 
changing and booming international PV market; 
second, China’s PV-targeted government policies 
and incentives; and finally, the increasing demand for 
clean energy (especially electricity) in China and the 
need to remediate the deteriorating environment due 
to pollution emissions from coal-fired power plants. 
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Figure 1. China’s Installed Capacity of Solar Electricity 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_power_in_China. 
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The cases resulted in penalties of 
18.32-249.96% for anti-dumping duties 
and 14.70-15.97% for anti-subsidy 
duties against solar cells and mod-
ules imported from China. Similarly, 
EU Prosun, an industry association 
of European solar PV manufactur-
ers, filed a suit with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2012. The 
European Commission launched its 
own dumping investigation in 2012, 
which mandated that Chinese PV mod-
ules and component imports into the 
European Union (EU) be subjected to 
an average anti-dumping duty of 47.6%. 
In addition, the EU now requires 
China to commit to an import quota 
and a minimum import price based on 
the Bloomberg average international 
price for PV modules. 
Following these dumping investiga-
tions and repercussions, China expe-
rienced an 18% decrease in PV panel 
exports, including a 62% decrease to 
European markets. Although these 
trade wars damaged China’s PV panel 
export revenues, China remained  
the leading manufacturing of PV panels 
in 2012 with roughly two-thirds of 
total global production. Moreover, 
China’s PV manufacturers continue  
to pursue moving their production  
to other counties. For example, in 
January 2016, Yingli, one of the 
largest Chinese PV module produc-
ers, announced plans to partner with 
Demeter Power to produce multi- 
crystalline PV panels in Thailand.
China’s Solar Energy Policy
According to Bloomberg, the Chinese 
government’s investment in clean 
energy was $110.5 billion in 2015. 
According to International Energy 
Agency (IEA), in the past 20 years, 
starting with the Brightness Program in 
1996, China has introduced 50 energy 
policies, half of which are directly 
related to solar production, and the 
other half to multiple renewable energy 
sources in general. These policies can 
be categorized into five major types: 
government policy support, economic 
instruments, regulatory instruments, 
research development and deployment, 
and information and education. The 
largest category is policy support and  
it includes three subcategories: strategic 
planning, institutional creation and 
general policy support. Regulatory 
instruments (such as codes and stand-
ards) were introduced frequently after 
2013 when China’s solar PV industry 
faced another round of challenges, 
including antidumping investiga-
tion and overcapacity. But there has 
been very little detectable activity in 
the areas of research, development 
and deployment, or information and 
education. 
As the second largest category, eco-
nomic instrument policies consist of 
fiscal/financial incentives such as taxes, 
feed-in tariffs, grants and subsidies. 
Three policies in particular mark the 
government’s commitment to the solar 
PV industry. In 2002, it initiated a 
“Power Supply Plan for Rural Areas 
without Electricity in the Western 
Provinces and Regions,” which pro-
moted PV application in remote areas. 
Incentive-based policies led to the 
installation of a 4.3GW solar power sta-
tion (2009-12) in northwestern China; 
in the same period, another policy, 
“Golden-Sun,” provided incentives 
to more than 700 solar power plants, 
each with 5.8GW capacity. Like most 
Western countries, China also adopted 
Feed-in-Tariffs (FiT)—long-term 
contracts provided to renewable energy 
producers, with variable rates per 
kilowatt hour of energy produced (i.e. 
in areas with the highest solar radiation, 
the FiT is lower because the generat-
ing cost is also lower). Through these 
efforts, the government’s incentivizing 
has changed from “pushing” the supply 
side to “pulling” the demand side.
PV in the Domestic Market
On one hand, China’s demand for 
energy, especially electricity, continues 
to increase. Even with the slowest rate 
of growth since 1998, the electric-
ity demand in China reached 5500 
terawatt hours (TWh) in 2015. On the 
other hand, the deteriorating environ-
ment due to the pollution emissions 
from coal-fired power plants makes a 
switch to renewable energy sources, 
especially solar energy, critical to 
improving living conditions. In 2014, 
air pollution led to more than 200 
unhealthy days due to poor air quality 
in Beijing (G. Gao, “As Smog Hangs 
Over Beijing,” www.pewresearch.org 
[2015]). The smog in China is a severe 
problem. About 60% of the country’s 
power is generated from coal and  
solar power is an obvious, safer alterna-
tive. Solar power generates electricity 
through semiconductors and its  
application can be categorized into  
two types: centralized systems or  
distributed systems. 
In 2002, [China] initiated a 
“Power Supply Plan for Rural 
Areas without Electricity in the 
Western Provinces and Regions,” 
which promoted PV application 
in remote areas. 
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Centralized solar applications are large-
scale systems run by utility companies, 
while decentralized applications are 
photovoltaic systems installed on the 
rooftops of residential buildings, busi-
ness buildings – such as warehouses 
and shopping malls, and in other public 
areas – such as those at schools and air-
ports. In 2015, the cumulative capacity 
of centralized systems accounted for 
84% of total installed capacity, while 
distributed accounted for only 16%. 
Both sorts of applications face signifi-
cant challenges to potential expansion.
For centralized solar applications, there 
are three major obstacles. First, land 
use is a serious problem; to build a 
solar PV plant, large areas are needed. 
Regulations within China’s different 
government departments vary, and 
getting permission for land use is very 
challenging. Also, taxes related to land 
use have significantly increased the 
cost of solar PV electricity generation. 
Second, China’s vast geography is an 
obstacle to efficient solar generation 
and use. The provinces in northwestern 
China have sufficient solar resources, 
such as long hours of sunshine and large 
spare landscapes, and a great potential 
to generate solar power. But transmit-
ting it to the populous and industrial 
East is the challenge. In 2015, Chinese 
solar PV producers abandoned 4.65 bil-
lion KWh, or 12.62% of the country’s 
solar PV installed capacity. Gangsu, 
Qinghai, Xinjiang and Ningxia prov-
inces abandoned the largest percentage 
of solar electricity. The uneven geo-
graphic distribution of solar resources 
and economic development is a serious 
issue and the significant power loss dur-
ing the transmission process renders this 
business model unsustainable. 
The third major obstacle for further 
developing large-scale solar-powered 
systems involves long waiting periods 
for permission from local governments, 
power-supply companies and the other 
administrative departments. Numerous 
projects did not receive government 
subsidies on time as promised; in one 
case, a group of projects experienced 
a two-year delay, which increased the 
generation cost and reduced the returns 
on investment. These delays have had 
a chilling effect for householders, who 
hesitate to submit their rooftop PV sys-
tem adoption applications. The adop-
tion of solar PV systems by households 
is slow. The complicated application 
process, lack of knowledge of solar PV 
systems, and large initial investments 
are prohibitive reasons. Some cultural 
reasons—such as fear of breaking away 
from centralized energy systems—may 
also be delaying the adoption process. 
PV Supply Chain
A full understanding of China’s 
PV industry requires a thorough 
Distributed PV System on the Roof of an Industrial Plant, Changzhou. Author’s photo.
…China remained the leading 
manufacturing of PV panels in 
2012 with roughly two-thirds of 
total global production. 
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investigation of its supply chain struc-
ture. Figure 2 illustrates the PV panel 
production process. Raw materials 
such as crystalline, or multicrystalline 
silicon, both of which have high purity 
levels of silicon, are cast into ingot and 
then cut into pieces, or wafers, which 
can be used to produce solar cells. 
Multiple solar cells are then strung 
together to make a solar module. A 
solar panel includes a solar module and 
a balance of systems including wiring, 
invertors for transforming AC to DC, 
batteries and other electronic parts. 
Finally, an installer takes the solar panel 
and installs it at a selected site.
The development of the Chinese solar 
PV industry has faced different chal-
lenges in different periods. In 2005, 
high-purity silicon and wafers were  
in short supply due to the rapidly 
increasing production of solar PV  
panels. As a result, producers sought  
to secure silicon supply through long-
term contracts with silicon/wafer 
suppliers using common strategies of 
supply-chain management. But this  
led to other problems. 
Soon, the pendulum had swung too far 
the other way. Over production led to 
a glut of silicon, wafers and PV panels 
causing a sharp drop in prices at all the 
stages of production, sometime after 
2008. For example, in 2015, China’s 
multicrystalline production was more 
than 165 thousand tons, double the 
amount of 2013. Overcapacity caused 
a reduction in the average price to 124 
thousand renminbi (RMB)/ton, a 
decrease of 22.6% from 2014. Because 
of the low (almost zero) profit margin, 
only 15 multicrystalline manufactur-
ers survived, but the largest six of them 
together have an annual capacity more 
than 10 thousand tons—more than half 
of the Chinese solar power market. 
Overcapacity led to the price reduction 
of solar modules from 36 RMB/Watt 
peak capacity (Wp) ($6 USD/ Wp) in 
2007 to an average of 4.04 RMB/Wp 
($0.66 USD/Wp) in 2015.
With the pressure of declining rates and 
the anti-dumping investigations in the 
global market, many Chinese PV panel 
producers and their suppliers went out 
of business between 2012 and 2014 
because they did not anticipate these 
dramatic changes. In this field, verti-
cal integration may potentially lead to 
business failure, especially if a company 
does not have sufficient resources or 
the competitive advantages to operate 
in the new field. Similarly, long-term 
contracts can introduce inf lexibility 
into supply-chain management, which 
increases the risk of supply-chain inter-
ruption when the market changes. For 
example, SunTech, the largest producer 
of PV panels in China, was founded in 
2001 and reached its peak in 2008. In 
July 2006, SunTech signed a 10-year 
contract (with pre-determined pricing) 
with U.S.-based Monsanto Electronic 
Materials Company (MEMC) to ensure 
a supply of solar wafers. With the drop 
of wafer prices in 2011 and the over-
production of solar panels, SunTech had 
to terminate its contract with MEMC 
and pay a penalty of $120 million. One 
wrong purchasing decision led directly 
to SunTech’s bankruptcy in 2012. 
Within the last 10 years, the rapid 
growth of China’s solar PV industry  
has been phenomenal. The future of 
solar PV industry in China is very 
promising; however, developing its 
solar PV sector in a healthy way still  
has a long way to go. With increas-
ing competition and regulation in 
the global market and strong pres-
sure domestically due to over capacity 
and continuous price reduction, the 
Chinese government and Chinese PV 
panel producers have steeper hills to 
climb than they did 10 years ago. But 
even in the changed and changing 
circumstances, solar PV remains a good 
solution for China, not only to meet the 
increasing demand for electricity, but 
also to reduce the pollution emissions 
from coal-fired power plants.
Figure 2. PV Supply Chain Structure 
Sources: www.microchemicals.com/products/wafers/from_the_ingot_to_finished_silicon_wafers.html;  
www.utech-solar.com/en/index.html; kemiwafers.com/cells.php; solardo.eu/photovoltaik/solarmodule/.
 Raw Material Ingot Wafer Solar Cell Solar Module Solar Panel
Xiangrong Liu is Assistant Professor  
and Internship Coordinator in the 
Management Department.
